The Battle of Megiddo, Egyptian Account

1469 BC

Mighty Bull, Shining in Thebes; King of Upper and Lower Egypt, Lord of the Two Lands; Menkheperre; Son of Re.

His Majesty commanded to cause to be recorded his victories which his father, Amon, gave to him, upon a tablet in the temple which his majesty made for his father, Amon, setting forth each expedition by its name, together with the plunder which his majesty carried away therein. It was done according to all the command which his father, Re, gave to him.

Year 22, fourth month of the second season, on the twenty-fifth day his majesty was in Tharu on the first victorious expedition to extend the boundaries of Egypt with might.

Now, at that period the Asiatics had fallen into disagreement, each man fighting against his neighbor. Now, it happened that the tribes - the people, who were there in the city of Sharuhen; behold, from Yeraza to the marshes of the earth, they had begun to revolt against his majesty.

Year 23, first month of the third season, on the fourth day, the day of the feast of the king's coronation, he arrived at the city, the possession of the ruler, Gaza.

Year 23, first month of the third season, on the fifth day; departure from this place in might, - in power, and in triumph, to overthrow that wretched foe, to extend the boundaries of Egypt, according as his father, Amon-Re, had commanded that he seize.

Year 23, first month of the third season, on the sixteenth day, he arrived at the city of Yehem.

His majesty ordered a consultation with his valiant troops, saying as follows: "That wretched enemy, the chief of Kadesh, has come and entered into Megiddo; he is there at this moment. He has gathered to himself the chiefs of all the countries which are on the water of Egypt, and as far as Naharin, consisting of the countries of the Kharu, the Kode, their horses, their troops. Thus he speaks, 'I have arisen to fight against his majesty in Megiddo.'"

They spoke in the presence of his majesty, "How is it, that we should go upon this road, which threatens to be narrow? While they come and say that the enemy is there waiting, holding the way against a multitude. Will not horse come behind horse and man behind man likewise? Shall our advance-guard be fighting while our rear-guard is yet standing yonder in Aruna not having fought? There are yet two other roads: one road, behold, it will carry us, for it comes forth at Taanach, the other, behold, it will bring us upon the way noth of Zefti, so that we shall come out to the north of Megiddo. Let our victorious lord proceed upon the road he desires; but cause us not to go by a difficult road."

Thenwent messengers concerning this design which they had uttered, in view of what had been said by the majesty of the Court: "I swear, as Re loves me, as my father Amon, favors me, as my nostrils are rejuvenated with satisfying life, my majesty will proceed upon this road of Aruna. Let him who will among you, go upon those roads ye have mentioned, and let him who will among you, come in the following of my majesty. Shall they think among those enemies whom Re detests: 'Does his majesty proceed upon another road? He begins to be fearful of us,' so will they think."

They spoke before his majesty: "May thy father Amon, lord of Thebes, presider over Karnak, grant thee life. Behold, we are the following of thy majesty in every place, whither thy majesty proceedeth; as the servant is behind his master."

Then his majesty commanded the entire army to march upon that road which threatened to be narrow. His majesty swore, saying: "None shall go forth in the way before my majesty." He went forth at the head of his army himself, showing the way by his own footsteps; horse behind horse, his majesty being at the head of his army.

Year 23, first month of the third season, on the nineteenth day; the watch in safety in the royal tent was at the city of Aruna. "My majesty proceeded northward under the protection of my father, Amon-Re, lord of Thebes, who went before me, while Harakhte strengthened my arms."

The enemy went forth in numerous battle array. The southern wing was in Taanach the northern wing was on the ground south of Megiddo. His majesty cried out to them before they fell; behold, that wretched foe of the city Aruna.

Now, the rear of the victorious army of his majesty was at the city of Aruna, the front was going forth to the valley; they filled the opening of this valley. Then they said in the presence of his majesty: "Behold, his majesty goeth forth with his victorious army, and it has filled the hollow of the valley; let our victorious lord hearken to us this time and let our lord protect for us the rear of his army and his people. Let the rear of this army come forth to us behind; then shall they also fight against these barbarians; then we shall not need to take thought for the rear of our army." His majesty halted outside and waited there, protecting the rear of his victorious army.

Behold, when the front had reached the exit upon this road, the shadow had turned, and when his majesty arrived at the south of Megiddo on the bank of the brook of Kina, the seventh hour was turning, measured by the sun.

Then was set up the camp of his majesty, and command was given to the whole army, saying: "Equip yourselves! Prepare your weapons! for we shall advance to fight with that wretched foe in the morning." Therefore the king rested in the royal tent, the affairs of the chiefs were arranged, and the provisions of the attendants. The watch of the army went about, saying, "Steady of heart! Steady of heart! Watchful! Watchful! Watch for life at the tent of the king." One came to say to his majesty, "The land is well, and the infantry of the South and North likewise."

Year 23, first month of the third season, on the twenty-first day, the day of the feast of the new moon, corresponding to the royal coronation, early in the morning, behold, command was given to the entire army to move. His majesty went forth in a chariot of electrum, arrayed in his weapons of war, like Horus, the Smiter, lord of power; like Montu of Thebes, while his father, Amon, strengthened his arms. The southern wing of this army of his majesty was on a hill south of the brook of Kina, the norther wing was at the northwest of Megiddo, while his majesty was in their center, with Amon as the protection of his members, the valor of his limbs. Then his majesty prevailed against them at the head of his army, and when they saw his majesty prevailing against them they fled headlong to Megiddo in fear, abandoning their horses and their chariots of gold and silver. The people hauled them up, pulling them by their clothing, into this city; the people of this city having closed it against them and lowered clothing to pull them up into this city. Now, if only the army of his majesty had not given their heart to plundering the things of the enemy, they would have captured Megiddo at this moment, when the wretched foe of Kadesh and the wretched foe of this city were hauled up in haste to bring them into this city. The fear of his majesty had entered their hearts, their arms were powerless, his serpent diadem was victorious among them.

Then were captured their horses, their chariots of gold and silver were made spoil, their champions lay stretched out like fishes on the ground. The victorious army of his majesty went around counting their portions. Behold, there was captured the tent of that wretched foe in which was his son. The whole army made jubilee, giving praise to Amon for the victory which he had granted to his son on this day, giving praise to his majesty, exalting his victories. They brought up the booty which they had taken, consisting of hands, of living prisoners, of horses, chariots of gold and silver...

Then spake his majesty on hearing the words of his army, saying: "Had ye captured this city afterward, behold, I would have given Re this day; because every chief of every country that has revolted is within it; and because it is the capture of a thousand cities, this capture of Megiddo. Capture ye mightily, mightily."

His majesty commanded the officers of the troops to go, assigning to each his place. They measured this city, surrounding it with an inclosure, walled about with green timber of all their pleasant trees. His majesty himself was upon the fortification east of this city, inspecting.

It was walled about with its thick wall. Its name was made: "Menkheperre Thutmose III-is-the-Surrounder-of-the-Asiatics." People were stationed to watch over the tent of his majesty; to whom it was said: "Steady of heart! Watch." His majesty commanded, saying: "Let not one among them come forth outside, beyond this wall, except to come out in order to knock at the other door of their fortification."

Now, all that his majesty did to this city, to that wretched foe and his wretched army, was recorded on each day by its the day's name. Then it was recorded upon a roll of leather in the temple of Amon this day.

Behold, the chiefs of this country came to render their portions, to do obeisance to the fame of his majesty, to crave breath for their nostrils, because of the greatness of his power, because of the might of the fame of his majesty the country came to his fame, bearing their gifts, consisting of silver, gold, lapis lazuli, malachite; bringing clean grain, wine, large cattle, and small cattle for the army of his majesty. Each of the Kode among them bore the tribute southward. Behold, his majesty appointed the chiefs anew.

340 living prisoners; 83 hands; 2,041 mares; 191 foals; 6 stallions; a chariot, wrought with gold, its pole of gold, belonging to that foe; a beautiful chariot, wrought with gold, belonging to the chief of Megiddo; 892 chariots of his wretched army; total, 924 chariots; a beautiful suit of bronze armor, belonging to that foe; a beautiful suit of bronze armor, belonging to the chief of Megiddo; 200 suits of armor, belonging to his wretched army; 502 bows; 7 poles of mry wood, wrought with silver, belonging to the tent of that foe. Behold, the army of his majesty took 1,929 large cattle, 2,000 small cattle, 20,500 white small cattle.

List of that which was afterward taken by the king, of the household goods of that foe who was in the city of Yenoam, in Nuges, and in Herenkeru, together with all the goods of those cities which submitted themselves, which were brought to his majesty: 38 lords of theirs, 87 children of that foe and of the chiefs who were with him, 5 lords of theirs, 1,796 male and female slaves with their children, non-combatants who surrendered because of famine with that foe, 103 men; total 2,503. Besides flat dishes of costly stone and gold, various vessels, a large two-handled vase of the work of Kharu, vases, flat dishes, dishes, various drinking-vessels, 3 large kettles, 87 knives, amounting to 784 deben. Gold in rings found in the hands of the artificers, and silver in many rings, 966 deben and 1 kidet. A silver statue in beaten work, the head of gold, the staff with human faces; 6 chairs of that foe, of ivory, ebony and carob wood, wrought with gold; 6 footstools belonging to them; 6 large tables of ivory and carob wood, a staff of carob wood, wrought with gold and all costly stones in the fashion of a scepter, belonging to that foe, all of it wrought with gold; a statue of that foe, of ebony wrought with gold, the head of which was inlaid with lapis lazuli; vessels of bronze, much clothing of that foe.

James Henry Brested, Ancient Records of Egypt: Historical Documents. (Chicago: 1906), II:175-188.

The Battle of Megiddo

By Troy Fox

In 1479 BC, Tuthmosis III moved against the king of Kadesh in Palestine, who had instigated other cities in the region to join him in revolt against Egypt, and who was undoubtedly backed by the military might of the Mitanni empire. Mitanni had created a network of vassal city-states in this region during the early 15th century BC. 

The king of Kadesh and his allies occupied Megiddo, a fortress which controlled the major military and trade road north to Lebanon and east to the Euphrates. Megiddo sat on a height where the road emerged from the constriction of the Aruna Pass into the Plain of Esdraelon. From the time of Tuthmosis III, when Megiddo enters the historical record, down to the 20th Century, this site has been one of the world's major battle grounds, and in the Book of Revelations of the Christian Bible (John 16:14-16) it is the place where the forces of evil will fight against the forces of God at the end of the world. "Armageddon" means "the mount of Megiddo." In World War I, British Field Marshall Edmund Allenby led Australian cavalry and Indian infantry up the Aruna Pass, surprising and defeating Turks on the tell (mound) of ancient Megiddo. Recent scholarship has proven that the 20th Century British warrior had very much in mind the tactics of Tuthmosis III over 3,000 years earlier. 

Most of what we know about Tuthmosis III's Battle for Megiddo was compiled by the military scribe, Tjaneni, and inscribed on the walls of the Hall of Annals in the Temple of Amun at Karnak in ancient Thebes (modern Luxor).

In order to suppress the Canaanite coalition, less then a year after assuming sole rule of Egypt Tuthmosis III marched his army in nine days from his border fortress of Sileh along the Sinai road known as the "Ways of Horus" to Gaza, the main Egyptian stronghold in Canaan. They maintained a marching rate of about fifteen miles per day along this road, but thereafter slowed to about eight miles per day until they reached Yaham eleven days later in mid May. Perhaps this indicates fatigue, or simply caution as they traveled through territory that could be considered potentially or actually hostile. In fact, along the way Tuthmosis III detached units commanded by general Djehuty in order to place the stronghold of Jaffa under siege so that his line of communications and possible retreat could be protected, an indication that the Canaanite alliance was significant within southern Canaan. 

At Yaham, they stopped to hold a war council concerning the route they would take onto the Plain of Esdraelon, where Megiddo was located. It was known that the Canaanites had concentrated their forces near Megiddo across the Carmel Ridge to which there were three access routes. The northern and southern routes were longer than the central route through Aruna, but were less easily defendable. Furthermore, the Aruna road was through a narrow and difficult pass over a ridge that was presumed (particularly by the enemy coalition) to be too difficult for an army to use. Taking that route meant that "horse must follow horse, and man after man", and to be strung out in such a manner was a recipe for disaster. Hence, Tuthmosis III's generals counseled the pharaoh to take the more conservative Yokneam or Taanakh routes.

'Now two (other) roads are here. One of the roads ( behold, it is [to the east of] us, so that it comes out at Taanakh. The other ( behold, it is to the north side of Djefti, and we will come out to the north of Megiddo. Let our victorious lord proceed on the one of [them] which is [satisfactory to] his heart, (but) do not make us go on that difficult road!'  

Inscription from the Amen Temple at Karnak. J. B. Pritchard Ancient Near Eastern Texts, 1969: p. 234. 

However, the advantage of the Aruna route was that it would allow the Egyptian army to debouch onto the Plain of Esdraelon less than a mile from the city of Megiddo. Also, many modern commentators, and perhaps the Canaanite collation as well, seem to forget the major virtues of the Egyptian Chariots. They were light vehicles, and it was certainly conceivable that many could be carried through the pass, while the horses were led separately. Furthermore, Tuthmosis III and his generals must have known, through reconnaissance, that the coalition forces, and particularly their chariotry, were deployed to cover the approaches of the two easier routes to Megiddo (particularly the one from Taanakh).  The Canaanite alliance would have been ideally positioned to attack the Egyptian forces had they entered the plain along the Taanakh approach, first by mass chariot attacks and then with a process of attrition of the Egyptian infantry by long range archery. Thus, even before the Egyptian army was finally able to deploy for battle, they would have already inflicted very heavy losses. 

Therefore, Tuthmosis III rejected the arguments of his generals and set out on the Aruna route. Notwithstanding the continued doubts of his officers, Tuthmosis announced his decision in a manner that gives some insight into his grasp of psychology, telling his officers that 

"...My majesty shall proceed upon this Aruna road! Let him of you who wishes come in the following of my majesty! Whatever their doubts about this plan, their loyalty to their lord, as he very well knew, was not in doubt!"

He reached the river Qinah south of Megiddo without encountering any opposition. This segment of the march took three days. Two days were spent approaching the Aruna road through the hills and finally the road was accessed in the early hours of the third day. It took an additional twelve hours for the whole Egyptian army to make the passage along the Aruna road, and it was not until late in the evening that they finally set camp on the plain. 

The pharaoh's gamble had paid off, and a tactical surprise had been achieved, for even as the Egyptian army poured out of the pass, the leading elements could see the main enemy forces rushing back to cover the approaches to Megiddo. By the time night fell, this coalition army lay in front of the Egyptian lines in a hasty arrangement to guard their city. 

The Egyptians rested during the night, though perhaps not very well. From text, we know that Tuthmosis III suspected the possibility of a night attack, for he admonished his troops to "...be steadfast, be steadfast! Be vigilant, be vigilant!. He ordered his soldiers to "...make your weapons ready, since one (the pharaoh) will engage in combat with the wretched enemy in the morning". It is therefore likely that many of his men spend a sleepless night. Furthermore, this was Tuthmosis III first major battle in which he was in overall command and the army had not fought a major engagement for some 20 years, so there was perhaps not the confidence among the troops that later triumphant language might imply. Should the morning's battle go against them, there was no real means of a hasty retreat, with nothing but the difficult Aruna pass behind them.  

The following morning, we are told that "Now a charge was laid upon the entire army to pass by...". The implication is that the army was ordered to parade past the pharaoh, resplendent in their full uniform with armor glittering, while horse plumes and flags fluttering in the breeze and standards were carried aloft amidst the sounding of war trumpets, the beating of drums and the thunderous shouts of acclaim. This theatrical display may have had the practical benefits of negatively impacting the morale of the enemy, and at the same time, buttressing the courage of the Egyptian men, many of whom would be seeing combat for the first time. It may thus have had a very real effect on the outcome of the ensuing battle. 

Tuthmosis III, in his war chariot of fine gold and electum, and wearing the "blue" or war crown, is described as being "adorned with the accoutrements of combat, like Horus, the Might of Arm, a lord of action like Montu, the Theban, while his father Amun made strong his arms. Now ready for battle, he divided his army into three wings. The northern division was positioned to the northwest of Megiddo which would provide his troops with a possible retreat should that become necessary, while the southern troops were located on a hill to the south of "the brook of Qina". The Pharaoh himself commanded the center wing. 

Opposed to the Egyptians, the enemy forces were described as vast, and while doubtless exaggerated, we are told that they numbered no fewer than 330 kings, each with his own army so that the Egyptians stood against "Millions of men, and hundreds of thousands of the chiefest of all the lands, standing in their chariots". 

From the surviving text, the overwhelming impression is that the attacking Canaanites were completely routed so badly that a wave of panic swept through the coalition army. An Egyptian scribe reported that : "The king himself, he led the way of his army, mighty at its head like a flame of fire, the king who wrought with his sword. He went forth, none like him, slaying the barbarians, smiting Retenu, bringing their princes as living captives, their chariots wrought with gold, bound to their horses." Soon, the enemy abandoned their weapons, equipment, chariots and horses and turned to flight, but were so hotly pursued, that the defenders of Megiddo refused to open the gates of the city for their retreat. Rather, knotted sheets were lowered over the fortified walls so that at least the high and mighty among the defeated, including the king of Kadesh and the ruler of Megiddo could be saved.  

However, instead of attacking the city the Egyptians began to loot the abandoned camps, which gave many more of the enemy a chance to escape and time to organize their defense of the city. Our ancient text explains that "...if only his majesty's army had not given their hearts to capturing the possessions of the enemy, they would have captured Megiddo at this time..." Thus, it was recognized even by the Egyptians of this time that a breakdown in discipline had robbed the pharaoh of a quick victory, since Megiddo could have probably been stormed and taken in the immediate panic of the initial battle. 

However, the conquest of Megiddo and its inhabitants was vital, for "...the ruler of every northern country is in Megiddo, and its capture is the capture of a thousand cities". Therefore, the city was placed under siege. A moat was excavated around the city and beyond a wooden palisade was built to seal in the population. However, not until December of 1482 BC did the city finally surrender. While the booty from this battle was vast, the pharaoh seems to have been most proud of the capture of 2,041 horses that were taken and used to swell the breeding stock in Egypt. Other spoils of the battle included 894 chariots, including two that were covered with gold, 200 suits of armor, including two of bronze belonging to the chiefs of Megiddo and Kadesh, and over 25,000 animals other than horses. 

Tuthmosis III led many more campaigns through Canaan and into Syria, and eight years after the battle of Megiddo he took Kadesh on the Orontes. However, his victory at Megiddo was of great importance, for it was sufficient to render the whole of Canaan quiescent for virtually the rest of his reign. Following the conquest of Retenu, he built a big navy, which was instrumental in his extending Egyptian influence over much of the Near East. His army could now reach any coastal town in Syria by ship in four to five days, while by foot the journey would take more than a fortnight. This would greatly aid Tuthmosis III in his campaigns over the next 20 years in his contest with Mitanni for the control of Syria.

See also:

• The Egyptian Account of the Battle of Megiddo
• The Egyptian Military Part I and II

References:

Archives

Ramses II: The Battle of Kadesh
c.1299 BCE [2]

    The decisive war between the Egyptians and the Hittites for the control over Syria took place in the fifth year of the reign of Ramses II. The battle of Kadesh resulted from the defection of Amurru to Egypt. While the Hittites wanted to bring Amurru back into the fold, the Egyptians tried to protect their new vassal. Using Karkemish as a base for their operations, the Hittites decided Kadesh offered the best opportunities for the coming battle. Muwatalli had called on his allies, among them Rimisharrinaa, king of Aleppo

    ... the Sun, the Great King of Hatti, son of Mursili, and all the House of Suppiluliuma, will be allies of the king of Aleppo. The gods of Hatti and the gods of Aleppo will be witnesses and guarantors of this treaty.

    The country of Kizwadna

    which had belonged to Hatti in the times of Suppiluliuma and had been aquired by the Hurri, belongs again to Muwatalli. Its king will send one hundred horses equipped [with chariots] and a thousand footsoldiers to the army of the Sun, who will provide for them.

    Similar treaties had been concluded with most of Hatti's neighbours, resulting in a hotchpotch, not the most reliable kind of army a king could lead into battle.

    The army of Ramses on the other hand consisted mostly of Egyptians, with a few Nubian contingents and some Sherden mercenaries and recruits from Amurru. The chariots were manned exclusively by Egyptian noblemen.

     At this time, a force from Amurru arrived unexpectedly, surprised the pilfering Hittites and drove them out of the camp.
    (In the Kadesh reliefs the na'runa, who successfully defended the camp, are equated with sDm-aS (Sedjemash), which accords well with the meaning of Ugaritic n'rm. The na'runa were according to this interpretation camp-followers: servants, grooms and others)
    Muwatalli sent an additional 1000 chariots led by the kings of Aleppo and Karkhemish, two of his own brothers and many allied princes, but kept most of his infantry to himself on the far side of the river.     Ramses reorganized his forces and the Hittites escaped being surrounded by the Egyptians by retreating towards Kadesh.
    After receiving a message from Muwatalli, Ramses decided to retreat. According to the Egyptians, the "wretched, vanquished chief of Hatti" pleaded with the pharaoh

    Suteh are you, Baal himself, your anger burns like fire in the land of Hatti... Your servant speaks to you and announces that you are the son of Re. He put all the lands into your hand, united as one. The land of Kemi, the land of Hatti, are at your service. They are under your feet. Re, your exalted father, gave them to you so you would rule us. Is it good, that you should kill your servants? ... Look at what you have done yesterday. You have slaughtered thousands of your servants ... You will not leave any inheritance. Do not rob yourself of your property, powerful king, glorious in battle, give us breath in our nostrils.

    The route through the Biqa'a valley being considered too risky, it was decided to take the route east of it, through Upe in the region of Damascus.

     The battle of Kadesh should perhaps not be called a battle in the strictest sense of the word, but rather a large-scale skirmish preceding the decisive encounter which in the end never took place. Nevertheless, Muwatalli was able to rob his opponent of the initiative and eliminated about a third of his troops.
    The failure of Ramses' campaign was a result of his tactical mistakes. He did not send enough scouts to explore the countryside sufficiently, the divisions were separated by up to 15 kms from each other and there was no adequate protection of the flanks. Still, the king blamed his troops

    None of you was there... None rose to lend me his hand in my fight... None of you came later to tell the story of his heroic deeds in Egypt.... The foreigners who saw me, praise my name to the end of all lands where I was not known... Since ancient times a man was honoured for his fighting abilities, but I will not reward any of you, as you have abandoned me when I was alone fighting my enemy.

    Ramses described the campaign as a splendid victory, while in reality Kadesh remained in Hittite hands, Amurru fell to the Hittites and the Egyptian losses were substantial.

• Egyptian accounts of the battle of Kadesh: 1) The introduction to the poem of Pentaur, 2) The official record    

Picture of the battle      

    Apart from the scenes in which Qadesh itself is represented with some bridges over its encircling moats, it is clear that, if in May the Orontes was at its lowest point, it is also true that a quick transfer of chariots in some kind of temporary wooden bridges would have taken a lot of time. A chariot might require an overall space of about 5 x 2.5 m, so that an ordinary crossing of a bridge needed at least two pairs of chariots. Thus, an entire group of 200 or 300 chariots with an average speed of 20 km/h could cross a bridge at least in one or two hours, to reconstruct the attack order. Hence, certain practical limits can be set on the Hittite surprise attack on Ra-division in march. It is impossible to assume that the Hittite charioteers, who attacked and crashed through the midst of Ra, were only the " first battle line" of the group itself. Breaking a compact force of 5000 men in march - like an Egyptian division - needs a prolonged attack of a massive chariot-force. In this circumstance it is right to assume that a chariot-force marshalled to fight in a open plain, like those of Qadesh, would have been visible at the advancing column of the Ra-division. Similarly, the advancing of Hittite forces (chariots and infantry) from their encampment to cross the Orontes, in correspondence with the line of march of Ra, would have been visible from the Egyptian camp.

From Some Tactical Remarks on the Battle of Qadesh by Giacomo Cavillier
(University of Rome "La Sapienza")

[2] c.1299 : Like all dates of this period, this one should be taken with a grain of salt. The events took place in the 5th year of the reign of Ramses II. It is unfortunately unknown when his reign began.

The Battle of Kadesh

(1275 BC): major battle between the Egyptians under Ramses II and the Hittites under Muwatallis in Syria southwest of Homs on the Orontes River. Seeking to recapture the Hittite held city of Kadesh in Syria Ramses II invaded Syria with four divisions and an auxiliary force. Muwatallis gathered a large alliance among his vassal states and, hiding his army behind the city mound, sent out false reports that he was at Aleppo farther north. Ramses, falling into the trap, hurried his army toward Kadesh, his units stretched along the Orontes Valley road. Toward evening Ramses II with the first division reached Kadesh and set up camp. Too late, two captured Hittite scouts confessed the actual situation. The Hittites forded the river and after routing the second division, stormed the Egyptian camp. His first division destroyed, Ramses was saved mostly by his auxiliary force that struck the attacking Hittites in the rear. Pushing the Hittites into the river, the mauled Egyptians retained the battlefield. The next day after indecisive fighting Ramses was compelled to withdraw his battered army; and in the aftermath the Hittites advanced south to the region of Damascus, halting the Egyptian resurgence into Syria. The biased Egyptian version of the battle was recorded on numerous temples by Ramses but a Hittite version excavated at Boghazköy has enabled a truer assessment of the battle .....

Ramesses II's Battle of Kadesh Inscriptions

By Megaera Lorenz

    Ramesses II left a detailed official account of his battle with the Hittites at Kadesh. The battle, one of the most significant events of Ramesses' reign, took place in his 5th year (c. 1285 BCE). Although it did not end in a victory for either side, it did result in an alliance between Egypt and Khatti and a period of stability in the ancient Near East that would last for nearly a century.
    The text is divided into two sections, a bulletin and a poem (Lichtheim 1976: 57). Both of these were reproduced numerous times in the form of temple inscriptions and papyri. The events have been heavily glossed over in the official account, but the basic details of the battle can still be sifted through the veneer of propaganda.
    In the bulletin (Lichtheim 1976: 60-62), Ramesses describes a massive confederation of peoples from Canaan and the Mediterranean working alongside the Hittites. Among them are two of the groups now classified as Sea Peoples: the Karkisha and the Lukka. Throughout the text, these two peoples are always mentioned in close association with one another. 
    The basic events of the battle can be summarized as follows. Ramesses, taking his troops northward, encountered two bedouin working secretly as agents of the Hittites. The bedouin misled Ramesses into believing that the Hittite army was waiting in Khaleb far to the north, when in fact the Hittites and their allies were in hiding at Kadesh. Ramesses later ascertained the true location of the Hittite encampment from two captured Hittite scouts, and tried to send warnings to the other divisions of the Egyptian army. One of the Egyptian divisions, however, was caught off-guard by a group of Hittites crossing the Orontes. Ramesses rushed out to go to their aid, only to be surrounded by Hittites and their confederated allies. Ramesses and the charioteering units with him were able to break out and drive the Hittite forces back into their fortress, but the battle ended in a draw (Lichtheim 1976: 60-62).
    The poem (Lichtheim 1976: 62-72) gives a more detailed account of Ramesses' escape from the Hittite forces. Here the composition of the Hittite confederation is again described, and another of the future "Sea Peoples" is mentioned in the context of Ramesses' own soldiers. We are told that Ramesses' forces included Shardana captured in battle by the king and then put to work as mercenary troops.
    These accounts of the battle of Kadesh provide some important information about the status of the Sea Peoples at the height of the New Kingdom empire. The Lukka, Karkisha and Shardana were all significant military forces at this time, apparently operating mostly as mercenaries. Ramesses states in the poem that the Hittite king had ensured the cooperation of the Lukka and Karkisha (among others) by paying them off with booty that he had stripped from various conquered towns (Lichtheim 1976: 64). The Shardana had already been acting as mercenaries for Egypt and her territories since at least as early as the reign of Akhenaten (see The Amarna Letters), and would continue to act in that capacity at least through the time of Ramesses III (see The Medinet Habu Inscriptions). 

Bibliography: Ramesses II's account of the Battle of Kadesh, regnal year 5, c. 1285 BCE. Pp. 60-72 in:

Lichtheim, M.
   1976   Ancient Egyptian Literature. California: University of California Press.